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Abstract. Industry and academia have increased the deployment of
Network Functions Virtualization (NFV) on their environments, either
for reducing expenditures or taking advantage of NFV flexibility for ser-
vice provisioning. In NFV, Service Function Chainings (SFC) composed
of Virtualized Network Functions (VNF) are defined to deliver services
to different customers. Despite the advancements in SFC composition
for service provisioning, there is still a lack of proposals for ensuring the
integrity of NFV service delivery, i.e., detecting anomalies in SFC op-
eration. Such anomalies could indicate a series of different threats, such
as DDoS attacks, information leakage, and unauthorized access. In this
PhD, we propose a framework composed of an SFC Integrity Module
(SIM) for the standard NFV architecture, providing the integration of
anomaly detection mechanisms to NFV orchestrators. We present recent
results of this PhD regarding the implementation of an entropy-based
anomaly detection mechanism using the SIM framework. The results
presented in this paper are based on the execution of the proposed mech-
anism using a realistic SFC data set.
Keywords: Service Function Chaining, Network Functions Virtualiza-
tion, Anomaly Detection
1 Introduction
Network Functions Virtualization (NFV) was proposed to deal with the virtu-
alization of network functions usually performed by dedicated hardware devices
(e.g., firewalls, session border controllers, load balancers) [1]. In NFV, Virtual
Network Functions (VNF) are connected to each other, composing Service Func-
tion Chainings (SFC) for service delivery. Any anomaly in SFC operation, such
as missing elements, misconfiguration, and redirection, could lead to the inter-
ruption of the service delivery and, in some cases, could indicate attacks to the
network. For this reason, in this PhD, we propose an additional SFC Integrity
Module (SIM) to the NFV architecture [2]. SIM is a framework that allows the
implementation of different anomaly detection mechanisms and the integration
of such mechanisms into any NFV network under the control of NFV Orchestra-
tors (NFVO). In this PhD, our focus resides in: (i) the applicability of existent
and new anomaly detection mechanisms for SFC integrity in NFV environments,
(ii) how to integrate such mechanisms to the NFV Management and Orchestra-
tion (MANO) architecture [3], and (iii) the evaluation of anomaly detection
solutions in realistic NFV scenarios using the proposed SIM framework.
1.1 Motivation
In virtualized environments, vulnerabilities and exploits can lead to different SFC
threats, since virtualization elements of NFV environments are susceptible to
exploits. Examples of exploitable elements are container engines [4], hypervisors
[5], and virtual machines [6]. Therefore, solutions have been proposed to detect
anomalies in different NFV elements, such as VNFs [7], NFV services [8], and
SLA violations [9]. However, there is still a lack of proposals dealing with security
and integrity issues in the context of SFC [10]. In this PhD, we consider both
the lack of solutions for SFC integrity and the potential vulnerabilities of NFV
environments as research opportunities to be properly explored. To do so, we
first investigated and proposed a framework that allows the implementation of
anomaly detection techniques based on the NFV MANO information model.
2 SFC Integrity Framework
The NFV MANO architecture does not consider security-related tasks to protect
functions and services. In this PhD research, we seek to guarantee the integrity of
SFC operation for service delivery. Our proposal is designed to operate in NFV
networks ruled by NFVOs according to the standard NFV MANO architecture.
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Fig. 1. Detailed SIM architecture [2] – The SIM communicates directly with NFVOs,
using standard northbound APIs for requesting information regarding NFV elements
operation and also to forward the results of the anomaly detection analysis.
2.1 Proposed Approach
The NFVO sends cataloged and monitored information to an Orchestrator Ab-
straction Driver (OAD), depicted in Fig. 1 along with all SIM internal compo-
nents. The information is then processed and analyzed according to the anomaly
detection mechanisms implemented in the Detector component. If no anomalies
are detected, the results are stored in the Library for further access. Otherwise,
the results are filtered using the Filter module to specify the sources of such
anomalies. Once identified, SIM stores it in the Library and forwards a report
message to NFVO with the filtered results and suggestions from the Advisor
module for overcoming such anomalies, e.g., turn off unregistered VNFs.
2.2 Methodology
SIM was designed with specific elements for processing, analyzing, and filtering,
enabling the design and implementation of different anomaly detection mech-
anisms. In this paper, we advance our first investigation using entropy-based
anomaly detection [2] in two ways: (i) evaluating our solution using realistic
NFV data sets [11] and (ii) improving the entropy-based anomaly detection
mechanism to work with the current data set. These improvements enabled us
to analyze each customer individually, increasing the accuracy of the anomaly
detection mechanism. The data set was generated based on realistic information
regarding the number of network functions composing SFCs on lager scale enter-
prise networks (with around 100 VNFs) [11]: 2 to 7 VNFs per SFC, mostly 2 to 5
[12]. So the number of VNFs for a given customer follows a truncated power-low
distribution with exponent 2, minimum 2 and maximum 7. Following enterprise
reports, anomalies were injected in the data set with a likelihood of 60% [13].
We considered three anomaly types: (i) unregistered SFCs, (ii) missing SFCs,
and (iii) unauthorized changes in the SFC, such as additional or missing VNFs.
2.3 Results Obtained
Fig. 2 shows the entropy results of the anomaly detection mechanism consid-
ering 4 customers with different sets of SFCs. The detector creates a merged
list with cataloged and monitored information. As the number of elements with
low probability increases in the list, i.e., highly uncertain elements, the merged
entropy changes, indicating a disorder in the monitored elements. The merged
entropy varies according to the number and type of anomalies detected (repre-
sented by markers). In our experiments, anomalies of type (i) and (ii) decreased
the entropy value, since they involve adding or subtracting information, while
anomalies of type (iii) (changes in existing values) increased the entropy value.
It may lead to situations where anomalies of type (i) and (ii) cancel the entropy
variations caused by anomalies of type (iii) and vice-versa. Despite rare to oc-
cur, this problem should be properly addressed to avoid false negatives. With the
two-level approach of SIM (detection and filtering) it is possible to avoid false
negatives with fine-grained filters comparing monitored and cataloged informa-

























































































Fig. 2. Entropy results per customer. When anomalies occur (represented by markers),
the entropy values varies, according to the amount of anomalies and their type.
3 Conclusions and Future Work
This PhD aims to propose efficient solutions for maintaining the integrity of ser-
vice delivery in NFV environments. As first step, we proposed a SIM framework
that allows the implementation of different anomaly detection mechanisms to
analyze the network operation. The SIM modular architecture has the ability to
operate with different NFVOs, requiring only to adapt one specific block. For
future research, we foresee the following topics as good directions to follow.
Detection on different information levels. SIM was designed to operate at
different levels of information. In this way, we foresee the possibility to analyze
information regarding real-time resource consumption by virtual machines (e.g.,
CPU, RAM, disk) and network information (e.g., SFC traffic flows, bandwidth).
Evaluation of different detection mechanisms and network scenarios.
Different anomaly detection mechanisms could be more suitable for a given net-
work scenario, according to its characteristics. Analyzing the operation of differ-
ent mechanisms in different environments will lead to important insights.
Deployment on production networks. Our results are based on realistic
data sets generated according to real-world observations. However, production
networks may present unpredicted behaviors, such as communication problems
between NVFOs and other network elements. In this way, analyzing SIM oper-
ation in production networks is another important step of this PhD.
4 Acknowledgements
This research was performed partially within the FWO project “Service-oriented
management of a virtualised future internet”.
References
1. Chiosi, M., et al.: Network Functions Virtualisation (NFV). White Paper 1, ETSI
NFV ISG (2012) available at: https://portal.etsi.org/NFV/NFV White Paper.pdf.
2. Bondan, L., Wauters, T., Volckaert, B., Turck, F.D., Granville, L.Z.: Anomaly De-
tection Framework for SFC Integrity in NFV Environments. In: IEEE Conference
on Network Softwarization (NetSoft). (jul 2017 (to appear))
3. Quittek, J., et al.: Network Functions Virtualisation (NFV) - Management and
Orchestration. White paper, ETSI NFV ISG (2014)
4. Combe, T., Martin, A., Pietro, R.D.: To Docker or Not to Docker: A Security
Perspective. IEEE Cloud Computing 3(5) (Sept 2016) 54–62
5. Thongthua, A., Ngamsuriyaroj, S.: Assessment of hypervisor vulnerabilities. In: In-
ternational Conference on Cloud Computing Research and Innovations (ICCCRI).
(May 2016) 71–77
6. Wang, Z., Yang, R., Fu, X., Du, X., Luo, B.: A shared memory based cross-vm side
channel attacks in iaas cloud. In: IEEE Conference on Computer Communications
Workshops (INFOCOM WKSHPS). (April 2016) 181–186
7. Giotis, K., Androulidakis, G., Maglaris, B.S.: A scalable anomaly detection and
mitigation architecture for legacy networks via an openflow middlebox. Security
and Communication Networks 9 (Oct 2015) 1958–1970
8. Xilouris, G.K., Kourtis, M.A., Gardikis, G., Koutras, I.: Statistical-based Anomaly
Detection for NFV Services. In: IEEE Conference on Network Function Virtual-
ization and Software Defined Networks (NFV-SDN). (2016) (To appear)
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